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ABSTRACT	  	  Student	  loan	  debt	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  college	  degree	  are	  on	  the	  rise	  each	  year,	  even	  as	  the	  value	  of	  a	  college	  degree	  appears	  to	  be	  stagnant.	  Yet,	  little	  research	  is	  available	  on	  how	  the	  characteristics	  of	   student	   loans	  create	   the	   incentives	   that	  have	  caused	  this	  effect.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  create	  a	  two-­‐period,	  inter-­‐temporal	  model	  for	  examining	  two	   related	   questions.	   First,	   what	   effect	   do	   interest	   rates	   and	   the	   structure	   of	  student	   loans	   have	   on	   individuals’	   incentives	   to	   attend	   college?	   Second,	   how	   do	  expectations	  of	  graduating	  high	  school	  students	  about	  future	  earnings	  impact	  their	  decision	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college?	   I	  hope	  this	  will	  begin	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  programs	   currently	   available	   to	   students	   to	   fund	   a	   college	   education.	   Ultimately,	  with	   greater	   knowledge	   on	   how	   current	   programs	   fair	   in	   achieving	   their	   stated	  goals	   of	   promoting	   greater	   educational	   attainment	   throughout	   society,	   increasing	  social	   welfare,	   lessening	   the	   burden	   of	   student	   loan	   debt,	   and	   retaining	   revenue	  neutrality	   in	   government	   programs,	   we	   can	   hope	   for	   and	   expect	   more	   informed	  decisions	  by	  policy	  makers	  on	  this	  important	  topic.	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Chapter	  1:	  Overview	  
Student	  loan	  debt	  is	  an	  ever-­‐present	  issue	  for	  over	  43	  million	  Americans,	  who	  have	  amassed	  nearly	  1.3	  trillion	  dollars	  of	  outstanding	  debt.	  Year-­‐to-­‐year,	  these	  debt	  numbers	  are	  increasing,	  with	  the	  graduating	  class	  of	  2016	  accumulating	  6%	  more	  debt	  than	  the	  class	  of	  2015	  according	  to	  nonprofit	  loan	  refinancing	  company	  Student	  Loan	  Hero.	  	   The	  effects	  of	  this	  are	  far	  reaching.	  The	  incentives	  to	  attend	  college	  are	  diminished,	  leading	  to	  fewer	  college	  attendees	  and	  a	  less	  educated	  populace.	  Many	  individuals	  with	  high	  amounts	  of	  student	  debt	  are	  forced	  to	  declare	  bankruptcy,	  occasionally	  multiple	  times,	  putting	  the	  American	  dream	  and	  financial	  security	  further	  and	  further	  out	  of	  their	  reach.	  	  Taxpayers	  and	  lenders	  fear	  the	  impending	  liability	  should	  this	  debt	  become	  so	  great	  and	  so	  risky	  as	  to	  be	  entirely	  unmanageable.	  	   For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  issue	  of	  student	  loan	  debt	  has	  never	  been	  more	  important.	  It	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  newly	  elected	  President	  Trump	  included	  in	  his	  campaign	  platform	  an	  income-­‐based	  repayment	  proposal	  to	  combat	  growing	  student	  loan	  debt.	  Other	  candidates	  for	  that	  office,	  such	  as	  Senator	  Rubio,	  Senator	  Sanders,	  and	  Secretary	  Clinton	  discussed	  their	  own	  proposals	  during	  the	  2016	  presidential	  campaign.	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   Given	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  issue,	  more	  analysis	  of	  the	  potential	  options	  is	  needed.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  begin	  by	  reviewing	  the	  present	  research	  on	  the	  topic	  and	  discussing	  the	  policy	  options	  available	  for	  addressing	  student	  loan	  debt.	  Next,	  I	  construct	  a	  simple	  theoretical	  model	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  evaluate	  these	  policies.	  I	  then	  use	  the	  model	  to	  evaluate	  two	  research	  questions.	  First,	  what	  effect	  do	  interest	  rates	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  student	  loans	  have	  on	  individuals’	  incentives	  to	  attend	  college?	  Second,	  how	  do	  the	  expectations	  of	  graduating	  high	  school	  students	  about	  future	  earnings	  affect	  their	  decision	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college?	  My	  model	  does	  not	  evaluate	  the	  actual	  decisions	  of	  real	  people,	  but	  instead	  seeks	  to	  understand	  how	  interest	  rates	  and	  expectations	  affect	  the	  theoretically	  optimal	  decision.	  Finally,	  I	  summarize	  my	  findings	  and	  what	  they	  can	  tell	  us	  about	  these	  questions.	  	  
1.1.	  Literature	  Review	  
	   In	  analyzing	  the	  effects	  of	  student	  debt	  and	  student	  loan	  types,	  two	  important	  aspects	  are	  the	  different	  loan	  programs	  and	  prospective	  students’	  expectations	  on	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  attending	  college.	  It	  is	  worth	  reviewing	  the	  present	  literature	  on	  student	  loan	  debt,	  the	  cost	  of	  college,	  the	  role	  of	  government	  in	  paying	  for	  college,	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  such	  on	  students.	  This	  creates	  a	  context	  from	  which	  the	  results	  of	  the	  model	  I	  present	  can	  be	  analyzed.	  Without	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  ramifications	  of	  debt	  loads	  and	  government	  involvement,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  determine	  the	  deeper	  findings	  of	  the	  model.	  	   	  Is	  a	  college	  degree	  valuable?	  I	  discuss	  this	  more	  in	  depth	  in	  section	  1.3,	  but	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  the	  answer	  is	  a	  qualified	  “yes.”	  The	  qualifier	  is	  the	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assumed	  risk.	  Evidence	  suggests	  that,	  “…enrolling	  in	  college	  is	  equivalent	  to	  signing	  up	  for	  a	  lottery	  with	  large	  expected	  gains	  –	  indeed…college	  is	  a	  better	  investment	  today	  than	  it	  was	  a	  generation	  ago	  –	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  lottery	  with	  significant	  probabilities	  of	  both	  larger	  positive,	  and	  smaller	  or	  even	  negative,	  returns”	  (Avery	  and	  Turner	  2012,	  188).	  In	  her	  paper,	  Susan	  Dynarski	  writes,	  “The	  typical	  student	  holds	  debt	  that	  is	  well	  below	  the	  lifetime	  benefits	  of	  a	  college	  education”	  (2014,	  25).	  While	  I	  found	  numerous	  articles	  from	  mainstream	  media	  sources	  such	  as	  the	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  and	  Economist	  speculating	  on	  a	  student	  debt	  bubble,	  i.e.,	  where	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  college	  degree	  has	  risen	  above	  its	  actual	  value,	  the	  academic	  literature	  I	  came	  across	  only	  found	  the	  value	  of	  a	  college	  degree	  to	  still	  be	  substantially	  greater	  than	  the	  cost,	  such	  as	  the	  two	  cited	  above.	  Aside	  from	  these	  two	  examples,	  the	  paper	  by	  Daly	  and	  Bengali	  that	  I	  discuss	  in	  section	  1.3	  serves	  as	  a	  third	  such	  example.	  	   However,	  that	  a	  degree	  has	  value	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  a	  good	  investment	  for	  prospective	  students	  or	  taxpayers.	  There	  are	  student	  loan	  programs	  that	  have	  insurance	  against	  micro	  and	  macroeconomic	  shocks	  but	  these	  are	  not	  revenue	  neutral.	  Other	  programs	  are	  revenue	  neutral	  but	  lack	  insurance.	  The	  former	  benefits	  borrowers	  but	  is	  costly	  to	  taxpayers,	  while	  the	  latter	  negatively	  impacts	  borrowers	  but	  has	  no	  tax	  burden.	  There	  is	  academic	  literature	  suggesting	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  design	  a	  program	  that	  can	  insure	  borrowers	  against	  micro	  and	  macroeconomic	  shocks,	  while	  remaining	  revenue	  neutral,	  but	  only	  if	  more	  data	  on	  student	  borrowing	  were	  available	  (Dynarski	  2014).	  As	  long	  as	  such	  data	  are	  unavailable,	  arguments	  can	  be	  made	  for	  and	  against	  the	  cumulative	  value	  of	  government	  student	  loan	  programs.	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Arguments	  have	  been	  made	  for	  some	  time	  regarding	  the	  subsidization	  of	  higher	  education,	  assuming	  a	  revenue	  neutral	  program	  is	  difficult	  or	  infeasible	  to	  implement.	  On	  the	  one	  side,	  Milton	  Friedman	  wrote	  in	  1955	  that	  education’s	  primary	  purpose	  is	  to	  create	  citizenry	  capable	  of	  participation.	  Past	  this,	  government	  should	  only	  make	  funds	  available,	  “…not	  as	  a	  subsidy	  but	  as	  ‘equity’	  capital.	  In	  return,	  the	  student	  would	  obligate	  himself	  to	  pay	  the	  state	  a	  specified	  fraction	  of	  his	  earnings	  above	  some	  minimum,	  the	  fraction	  and	  minimum	  being	  determined	  to	  make	  the	  program	  self-­‐financing,”	  (16).	  	  This	  is	  likely	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  arguments	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  income-­‐based	  or	  pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐earn	  payment	  plan	  for	  undergraduate	  debt.	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  some	  argue	  this	  same	  level	  of	  responsibility	  to	  its	  citizens	  by	  a	  government	  is	  justification	  for	  subsidization.	  “The	  state	  owes	  citizens	  the	  right	  to	  an	  education	  adequate	  enough	  for	  them	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  making	  decisions	  that	  affect	  them…	  this	  might	  mean	  nothing	  more	  revolutionary	  than	  free	  tuition	  repaid	  by	  progressive	  taxes,	  or	  it	  might	  mean	  professional	  education	  repaid	  by	  national	  service	  for	  a	  period	  of	  time”	  (Engel	  1984,	  32).	  This	  debate	  may	  be	  resolved	  as	  we	  gain	  more	  knowledge	  and	  can	  create	  more	  agreement	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  student	  debt	  and	  increased	  subsidies	  on	  social	  welfare.	  	  	   Lochner	  and	  Monge-­‐Naranjo	  claim	  that	  subsidized	  student	  loans	  are	  highly	  inefficient,	  arguing	  that	  money	  would	  be	  much	  better	  used	  for	  grants	  or	  reduced	  tuition.	  Further,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  by	  subsidizing	  student	  loans	  with	  tax	  receipts	  there	  is	  actually	  a	  net	  decrease	  in	  social	  welfare	  (2015).	  However,	  evidence	  shows	  that	  this	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  the	  case.	  Wigger	  points	  out	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  tax	  code	  can	  have	  important	  implications	  on	  government’s	  ability	  to	  affect	  social	  welfare	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through	  education	  subsidies,	  such	  as	  subsidized	  undergraduate	  student	  loans	  (2004).	  In	  this	  discussion	  it	  is	  important	  to	  also	  recognize	  the	  social	  welfare	  cost	  of	  students	  who	  choose	  to	  forgo	  graduate	  level	  degrees	  due	  to	  burdensome	  undergraduate	  debt.	  Data	  show	  “Students	  with	  debt	  of	  $5,000	  or	  higher	  are	  significantly	  less	  likely	  to	  apply	  to	  graduate	  or	  first	  professional	  school	  than	  their	  peers	  who	  did	  not	  have	  educational	  debt”	  (Millett	  2003,	  19).	  	  	   	  Ultimately	  it	  appears	  that	  much	  more	  research	  is	  needed.	  While	  the	  literature	  I	  encountered	  suggests	  with	  some	  confidence	  that	  an	  undergraduate	  degree	  is	  valuable,	  it	  is	  still	  debatable	  to	  what	  level	  these	  degrees	  ought	  to	  be	  subsidized,	  if	  at	  all,	  through	  student	  loan	  programs.	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  the	  effects	  of	  overly	  burdensome	  student	  debt	  are	  on	  social	  welfare.	  	  	   In	  this	  paper,	  I	  seek	  to	  expand	  the	  current	  research	  through	  a	  study	  of	  how	  different	  loan	  types	  influence	  the	  incentives	  to	  pursue	  an	  undergraduate	  degree.	  My	  approach	  seeks	  to	  shed	  additional	  light	  on	  this	  important	  issue,	  and	  serve	  as	  a	  useful	  tool	  to	  policy	  makers	  trying	  to	  achieve	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  complex	  objectives.	  	  
1.2.	  Loan	  Types	  
	   The	  Stafford	  loan	  is	  the	  most	  common	  federal	  student	  loan	  available	  to	  incoming	  undergraduate	  students.	  These	  loans	  are	  split	  into	  subsidized	  and	  unsubsidized	  varieties	  based	  on	  financial	  need.	  These	  loans	  can	  be	  for	  a	  maximum	  of	  $57,500	  over	  a	  student’s	  four	  years,	  but	  with	  different	  limits	  each	  year	  based	  on	  a	  student’s	  classification	  and	  dependency	  status.	  The	  interest	  rate	  is	  fixed	  and	  tied	  to	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the	  10	  year	  U.S.	  Treasury	  bill,	  determined	  at	  the	  time	  of	  disbursement.	  Students	  can	  defer	  any	  payment	  until	  graduation.	  	  	   Far	  less	  common	  but	  preferable	  to	  Stafford	  loans	  are	  Perkins	  Loans.	  These	  loans	  are	  similar	  to	  Stafford	  loans,	  but	  typically	  have	  a	  lower	  interest	  rate	  and	  each	  undergraduate	  institution	  establishes	  its	  own	  eligibility	  requirements.	  Each	  loan	  program	  has	  its	  own	  federal	  funds	  pool.	  The	  size	  of	  this	  pool	  for	  Perkins	  loans	  is	  about	  one	  tenth	  that	  of	  the	  pool	  for	  Stafford	  loans.	  Because	  Perkins	  loans	  are	  far	  less	  available	  than	  Stafford	  loans,	  the	  limits	  on	  these	  loans,	  set	  by	  each	  university	  as	  stated,	  tend	  to	  be	  lower.	  For	  many	  students	  who	  qualify	  for	  Perkins	  loans,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  combine	  it	  with	  some	  level	  of	  Stafford	  loan	  in	  order	  to	  fully	  fund	  their	  education.	  	  The	  common	  characteristics	  of	  Perkins	  and	  Stafford	  loans,	  shown	  in	  the	  first	  two	  rows	  of	  Table	  1,	  are	  that	  they	  target	  low-­‐income	  families,	  offer	  a	  discounted	  interest	  rate	  compared	  with	  typical	  consumer	  loans,	  and	  require	  no	  credit	  history.	  According	  to	  Student	  Loan	  Hero,	  a	  student	  loan	  debt	  management	  company,	  these	  two	  low-­‐interest	  rate	  loan	  types	  account	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  new	  and	  outstanding	  student	  loans,	  78.2%	  of	  debtors	  and	  55.4%	  of	  total	  debt	  as	  of	  2012.	  There	  are	  also	  other	  unique	  refinancing	  options	  for	  students.	  These	  options,	  shown	  in	  the	  third	  through	  fifth	  rows	  of	  Table	  1,	  collectively	  account	  for	  $439.2	  billion	  of	  total	  student	  loan	  debt	  (34%	  of	  all	  debt),	  but	  only	  12	  million	  borrowers	  (27%	  of	  debtors).	  The	  most	  prevalent	  of	  these	  options	  is	  loan	  forgiveness.	  This	  typically	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  forgiveness	  in	  exchange	  for	  service.	  For	  example,	  anyone	  working	  in	  public	  service	  for	  ten	  years	  can	  have	  his	  or	  her	  federal	  student	  debt	  
	   7	  
forgiven.	  Similarly,	  one	  can	  have	  student	  debt	  forgiven	  on	  a	  state-­‐by-­‐state	  basis	  for	  pursuing	  careers	  in	  education,	  medicine,	  law,	  or	  other	  fields	  in	  high	  demand.	  	   Table	  1	  shows	  data	  on	  loan	  types	  available	  to	  undergraduates.	  	  
Table	  1	  –Loan	  Types	  
	  	   	  
Loan	  Type	   Interest	  Rate	   Eligibility	   #	  Debtors	  (%	  total)	   Outstanding	  Debt	  (%	  Total)	  
Stafford	   Tied	  to	  10	  yr.	  treasury	  note;	  3.76%	  in	  2016/17	  
Based	  on	  proven	  financial	  need	  through	  FAFSA	   31.9	  Million	  (72.2%)	   $690.3	  Billion	  (54.8%)	  
Perkins	   5%	   Based	  on	  proven	  financial	  need	  through	  FAFSA	   2.7	  Million	  (6.1%)	   $8	  Billion	  (0.6%)	  Private	   Varies	   Varies	  by	  Lender	   1.4	  Million	  (3.2%)	   $6.2	  Billion	  (0.5%)	  
Income-­‐based*	   Varies,	  based	  on	  annual	  income	   Varies	   3.1	  Million	  >	  5.27	  Million	  (7%	  >	  11.9%)	   $269	  Billion	  (21.3%)	  
Parent	  PLUS**	   Tied	  to	  10	  yr.	  treasury	  note;	  6.31%	  in	  2016/17	   Based	  on	  Credit	  Score	   3.3	  Million	  (7.5%)	   $74.5	  Billion	  (5.9%)	  Total	   N/A	   N/A	   44.2	  Million	  (100%)	   $1.26	  Trillion	  (100%)	  *Refinancing	  that	  includes	  all	  repayment	  plans	  that	  are	  based	  on	  your	  income,	  including	  income-­‐contingent	  (ICR),	  Income-­‐based	  (IBR),	  Pay	  as	  You	  Earn	  (PAYE),	  and	  Revised	  Pay	  as	  You	  Earn	  (REPAYE)	  plans.	  **Loan	  is	  taken	  out	  and	  paid	  back	  by	  parents	  rather	  than	  by	  student.	  Source:	  Data	  originates	  from	  the	  Federal	  Student	  Aid	  Office	  in	  the	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Education.	  Student	  Loan	  Hero,	  a	  student	  loan	  debt-­‐refinancing	  corporation,	  has	  consolidated	  the	  data	  for	  use	  here.	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Another	  option	  gaining	  popularity	  is	  income-­‐based	  or	  pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐earn	  loans.	  Under	  these	  schemes,	  students	  pay	  a	  percentage	  of	  their	  discretionary	  income,	  typically	  between	  10%	  and	  15%,	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  predetermined	  amount	  of	  years,	  usually	  between	  10	  and	  25	  years.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  time	  period,	  any	  remaining	  debt	  is	  forgiven.	  Finally,	  some	  students	  choose	  private	  loans.	  These	  can	  come	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  forms	  but	  typically	  are	  accompanied	  by	  a	  higher	  interest	  rate	  than	  federal	  loans.	  Perhaps	  for	  this	  reason,	  they	  are	  far	  less	  popular,	  accounting	  for	  less	  than	  half	  of	  one	  percent	  of	  all	  student	  loan	  debt.	  The	  primary	  benefit	  of	  private	  loans	  is	  typically	  higher	  limits.	  It	  is	  not	  uncommon	  for	  students	  to	  mix	  private	  loans	  with	  federal	  loans.	  	   There	  are	  many	  small	  programs	  for	  student	  borrowing	  and	  student	  loan	  refinancing	  not	  represented	  in	  the	  table.	  These	  programs	  are	  too	  small	  in	  nature	  to	  make	  discussion	  worthwhile,	  but	  together	  make	  up	  the	  remaining	  16.9%	  of	  student	  debt	  not	  presented	  in	  Table	  1.	  	   The	  three	  primary	  types	  of	  federal	  student	  loans	  are	  low-­‐interest	  rate	  loans,	  income	  based	  repayment	  schemes,	  and	  loan	  forgiveness.	  Although	  numerous	  options	  have	  been	  outlined	  above,	  these	  three	  types	  of	  loans	  account	  for	  99%	  of	  student	  loan	  debt.	  With	  my	  model,	  I	  will	  primarily	  focus	  on	  low-­‐interest	  rate	  loans,	  which	  make	  up	  a	  majority	  of	  student	  loans	  and	  student	  loan	  debt,	  for	  answering	  my	  first	  research	  question.	  In	  chapter	  4,	  I	  comment	  on	  how	  my	  model	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  analyze	  the	  characteristics	  of	  income	  based	  repayment	  schemes	  and	  loan	  forgiveness.	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1.3.	  The	  Value	  of	  a	  College	  Degree	  
	   In	  analyzing	  the	  incentives	  to	  attend	  college,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  earnings	  that	  a	  college	  degree	  provides	  over	  a	  high	  school	  diploma.	  While	  there	  may	  be	  an	  intrinsic	  value	  from	  a	  degree,	  for	  my	  purpose	  I	  assume	  the	  primary	  benefit	  is	  the	  increase	  in	  expected	  lifetime	  earnings.	  Understanding	  the	  value	  of	  a	  college	  degree	  will	  be	  especially	  important	  in	  answering	  the	  second	  research	  question,	  how	  do	  expectations	  of	  graduating	  high	  school	  students	  about	  future	  earnings	  affect	  the	  incentives	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college?	  	   Especially	  helpful	  in	  discussing	  the	  value	  of	  a	  college	  degree	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Mary	  C.	  Daly	  and	  Leila	  Bengali.	  In	  their	  paper,	  “Is	  it	  Still	  Worth	  Going	  to	  College?”	  they	  analyze	  the	  value	  of	  an	  undergraduate	  degree	  relative	  to	  a	  high	  school	  degree.	  They	  begin	  by	  analyzing	  the	  “earnings	  premium”	  of	  college	  graduates	  over	  high	  school	  graduates,	  finding	  that	  between	  1968	  and	  2011,	  college	  graduates	  earned	  a	  premium	  of	  between	  41%	  and	  61%	  per	  year.	  Daly	  and	  Bengali	  then	  broke	  these	  data	  down	  into	  three	  cohorts	  	  (groupings	  by	  20	  year	  graduation	  intervals),	  finding	  that	  this	  earnings	  premium	  has	  consistently	  risen	  with	  each	  new	  cohort	  and	  the	  more	  years	  individuals	  are	  past	  graduation.	  This	  is	  shown	  graphically	  in	  Figure	  1.1.	  Their	  work	  illustrates	  that	  for	  the	  1950s-­‐1960s	  cohort	  a	  college	  graduate	  could	  expect	  to	  earn	  $20,000	  more	  annually	  by	  the	  time	  they	  were	  ten	  years	  past	  graduation.	  This	  premium	  decreased	  slightly	  for	  the	  1970s-­‐1980s	  cohort	  before	  rising	  significantly	  for	  the	  1990s-­‐2000s	  cohort.	  Additionally,	  their	  study	  found	  that	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the	  range	  for	  this	  premium	  over	  the	  period	  studied	  was	  from	  a	  lifetime	  average	  of	  43%	  greater	  annual	  income	  in	  1980	  to	  61%	  greater	  annual	  income	  in	  2011.	  This	  consistent	  and	  significant	  earnings	  premium	  is	  credited	  to	  the	  value	  of	  a	  college	  degree,	  and	  the	  improved	  ability	  of	  college	  graduates	  to	  avoid	  unemployment,	  especially	  during	  economic	  downturns.	  
	  
Figure	  1.1	  –	  Earnings	  Premium	  of	  a	  College	  Degree	  	  Source:	  Reproduction	  of	  Daly	  and	  Bengali’s	  figure,	  pg.	  2;	  their	  text:	  “PSID	  and	  authors’	  calculations.	  Premium	  defined	  as	  difference	  in	  mean	  annual	  labor	  income	  of	  college	  graduates	  in	  each	  year	  since	  graduation	  and	  earnings	  of	  high	  school	  graduates	  in	  years	  since	  graduation	  plus	  four.	  Values	  are	  three-­‐year	  centered	  moving	  averages	  of	  annual	  premiums.”	  	   Finally,	  Daly	  and	  Bengali	  utilize	  a	  discounted	  future	  earnings	  model	  to	  determine	  break-­‐even	  values	  for	  attending	  and	  not	  attending	  college.	  Their	  ultimate	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  value	  of	  a	  college	  degree	  still	  exceeds	  the	  cost.	  Daly	  and	  Bengali	  find	  that	  the	  average	  college	  graduate	  pays	  off	  their	  degree	  by	  20	  years	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post-­‐graduation,	  and	  then	  continues	  to	  earn	  dividends	  throughout	  the	  remainder	  of	  their	  working	  life	  so	  that	  they	  have	  substantially	  higher	  lifetime	  earnings	  relative	  to	  high	  school	  graduates.	  Ultimately,	  the	  average	  college	  graduate	  in	  their	  study	  could	  expect	  to	  make	  over	  $830,000	  more	  in	  lifetime	  earnings,	  after	  subtracting	  the	  cost	  of	  tuition	  and	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  attendance.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  college	  degree	  had	  significant	  value	  into	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  21st	  century.	  However,	  in	  recent	  years	  the	  increasing	  cost	  of	  attendance	  combined	  with	  the	  increased	  cost	  from	  incurring	  significant	  college-­‐related	  debt	  threatens	  to	  erode	  this	  value.	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  many	  college	  graduates	  who	  incur	  such	  debt	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  pay	  off	  this	  debt	  20	  years	  post-­‐graduation	  and	  will	  never	  begin	  to	  accrue	  the	  dividends	  of	  a	  college	  degree.	  Additionally,	  students	  who	  fail	  to	  properly	  account	  for	  the	  full	  costs	  of	  a	  college	  degree	  or	  overestimate	  future	  earnings	  from	  a	  college	  degree	  may	  falsely	  believe	  attendance	  is	  their	  optimal	  choice.	  This	  is	  what	  I	  seek	  to	  evaluate	  using	  my	  own	  model	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  	  
1.4.	  Summary	  
	   Student	  loan	  debt	  is	  a	  significant	  issue	  in	  modern	  American	  life.	  While	  the	  value	  of	  a	  college	  degree	  is,	  in	  fact,	  on	  the	  rise,	  so	  are	  the	  costs.	  For	  students	  who	  can	  afford	  to	  pay	  for	  college	  without	  accruing	  debt,	  there	  are	  obvious	  and	  clear	  benefits.	  However,	  for	  many	  Americans,	  who	  don’t	  have	  such	  an	  opportunity,	  it	  is	  less	  obvious	  if	  the	  value	  of	  a	  college	  degree	  outweighs	  the	  full	  costs.	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   In	  chapter	  2,	  I	  present	  my	  model	  for	  examining	  this	  central	  issue.	  This	  model	  allows	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  incentives	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college	  for	  students	  who	  do	  require	  student	  loans.	  In	  chapter	  3,	  I	  manipulate	  the	  model	  to	  address	  the	  two	  central	  research	  questions.	  First,	  what	  effect	  do	  interest	  rates	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  student	  loans	  have	  on	  individuals’	  incentives	  to	  attend	  college?	  Second,	  how	  do	  the	  expectations	  of	  graduating	  high	  school	  students	  about	  future	  earnings	  affect	  their	  decision	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college?	  In	  chapter	  4,	  I	  conclude	  by	  summarizing	  my	  findings,	  conclusions,	  and	  areas	  for	  further	  research.	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Chapter	  2:	  Model	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  present	  the	  model	  that	  I	  use	  to	  analyze	  the	  questions	  enumerated	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  First,	  what	  effect	  do	  interest	  rates	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  student	  loans	  have	  on	  individuals’	  incentives	  to	  attend	  college?	  Second,	  how	  do	  the	  expectations	  of	  graduating	  high	  school	  students	  about	  future	  earnings	  affect	  their	  decision	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college?	  	   I	  begin	  by	  describing	  the	  basic	  two-­‐period	  inter-­‐temporal	  consumption	  model,	  followed	  by	  a	  numerical	  example	  of	  its	  application.	  I	  then	  expand	  the	  model	  by	  including	  alternate	  incomes	  for	  the	  choices	  to	  attend	  college	  or	  not	  attend	  college,	  and	  include	  an	  example	  of	  its	  application.	  Finally,	  I	  complete	  the	  model	  by	  incorporating	  cost	  of	  attendance.	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  clarify	  the	  model	  and	  begin	  to	  evaluate	  its	  robustness	  for	  analyzing	  the	  research	  questions.	  	  
2.1.	  Basic	  Model	  
	   I	  present	  a	  two-­‐period,	  inter-­‐temporal	  consumption	  model	  for	  assessing	  the	  decision	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college.	  This	  Cobb-­‐Douglas	  utility	  function	  is	  depicted	  in	  equation	  1,	  where	  C1	  represents	  consumption	  in	  the	  first	  period	  (period	  1)	  and	  C2	  represents	  consumption	  in	  the	  second	  period	  (period	  2).	  In	  equation	  1,	  C1	  has	  an	  exponent	  of	  1,	  while	  C2	  has	  an	  exponent	  of	  b,	  where	  0<b<1.	  The	  exponent	  b	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must	  be	  less	  than	  1	  but	  greater	  than	  0	  to	  show	  the	  relative	  preference	  for	  present	  consumption	  over	  future	  consumption.	  	  
 𝑈 𝐶!,𝐶! = 𝐶! ∗ 𝐶!!	   (1)	  
	   Second,	  I	  construct	  a	  budget	  constraint	  for	  this	  individual,	  whereby	  m1	  represents	  the	  individual’s	  first	  period	  income,	  m2	  represents	  the	  individual’s	  second	  period	  income,	  r	  represents	  the	  market	  interest	  rate,	  and	  C1	  and	  C2	  again	  represent	  period	  1	  and	  period	  2	  consumption,	  respectively.	  The	  budget	  constraint	  is	  depicted	  in	  equation	  2;	  the	  right	  hand	  side	  is	  total	  consumption,	  the	  left	  hand	  side	  is	  total	  income.	  The	  constraint	  is	  that	  total	  consumption	  cannot	  exceed	  total	  income.	  The	  period	  2	  values	  C2	  and	  m2	  are	  shown	  as	  discounted	  present	  values,	  i.e.,	  divided	  by	  (1+r)	  to	  value	  future	  amounts	  in	  present	  value.	  	  
 𝐶! + 𝐶!1+ 𝑟 = 𝑚! + 𝑚!1+ 𝑟 	   (2)	  	  Next,	  I	  evaluate	  the	  individual’s	  optimal	  consumptions	  for	  C1*	  and	  C2*	  by	  maximizing	  utility,	  given	  the	  budget	  constraint.	  	  The	  problem,	  its	  constraints,	  and	  its	  solution	  are	  shown	  in	  equation	  3.	  Appendix	  B	  shows	  the	  derivation	  of	  equation	  3.	  
 𝑈 𝐶!,𝐶! = 𝐶! ∗ 𝐶!!  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑜  𝐶! + 𝐶!1+ 𝑟 = 𝑚! + 𝑚!1+ 𝑟 	   (3a)	  
 𝐶!∗ = 11+ 𝑏 𝑚!1+ 𝑟 +𝑚! 	   (3b)	  
 𝐶!∗ = 𝑏1+ 𝑏 𝑚!(1+ 𝑟)+𝑚! 	   (3c)	  
 𝑈∗ = 𝐶!∗ ∗ 𝐶!∗!	   (3d)	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Equation	  3a	  depicts	  the	  constrained	  utility	  maximization	  problem.	  Equations	  3b	  and	  3c	  depict	  the	  optimal	  period	  1	  and	  period	  2	  consumption,	  respectively.	  Equation	  3d	  shows	  the	  maximum	  utility	  U*	  that	  the	  individual	  can	  achieve	  given	  the	  budget	  constraint.	  Equations	  3b	  and	  3c	  allow	  evaluation	  of	  whether	  the	  individual	  is	  a	  borrower	  or	  lender	  in	  period	  1.	  If	  C1*>m1,	  then	  the	  individual	  is	  a	  net	  borrower.	  Likewise,	  if	  
C1*<m1,	  the	  individual	  is	  a	  net	  lender.	  The	  relationship	  between	  C2*	  with	  m2	  is	  
inverse	  to	  the	  relationship	  of	  C1*with	  m1.	  Because	  a	  borrower	  in	  the	  model	  must	  repay	  principal	  and	  interest,	  borrowing	  in	  period	  1	  will	  make	  C2<m2	  and	  lending	  in	  period	  1	  will	  make	  C2>m2.	  This	  will	  be	  important	  in	  chapter	  3	  where	  I	  evaluate	  the	  individual’s	  decision	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college,	  and	  how	  different	  loan	  programs	  affect	  this	  decision.	  	  
2.2.	  Example	  of	  Basic	  Model	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  example,	  I	  use	  values	  that	  allow	  easy	  computations	  and	  portray	  the	  model’s	  basic	  intuitions.	  That	  stated,	  I	  use	  values	  of	  b=.5,	  m1=$50,	  
m2=$55,	  and	  r=.1	  (i.e.,	  a	  10%	  interest	  rate).	  Using	  these	  values	  in	  equations	  3b	  and	  3c	  yields	  optimal	  consumptions	  C1*=66.67	  and	  C1*=36.67.	  This	  person	  would	  be	  a	  net	  borrower	  of	  C1*-­‐m1=$16.67,	  with	  a	  utility	  of	  U*=404.	  	  This	  simple	  example	  illustrates	  how	  a	  person	  makes	  choices	  about	  current	  and	  future	  consumption,	  given	  each	  period’s	  income	  and	  the	  interest	  rate.	  When	  alternative	  income	  streams	  are	  introduced	  –	  income	  with	  a	  college	  degree	  and	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without	  –	  this	  model	  becomes	  an	  interesting	  tool	  for	  evaluating	  the	  choice	  to	  attend	  college.	  An	  example	  of	  the	  basic	  model	  is	  shown	  in	  figure	  2.1.	  
	  
Figure	  2.1	  –	  Example	  of	  Basic	  Model	  
	   The	  curved	  indifference	  curve	  represents	  the	  utility	  function.	  The	  straight	  line	  represents	  the	  budget	  constraint.	  The	  optimal	  choices	  C1*	  and	  C2*	  occur	  where	  the	  two	  are	  tangent.	  This	  is	  the	  highest	  utility	  the	  individual	  can	  achieve	  and	  still	  meet	  his	  or	  her	  budget	  constraint.	  	  
2.3.	  Expanded	  Model	  
	   In	  order	  to	  actually	  evaluate	  the	  decision	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college,	  it	  becomes	  important	  to	  expand	  the	  model	  to	  include	  the	  individual's	  choice	  between	  two	  different	  income	  streams.	  If	  the	  individual	  does	  not	  attend	  college,	  he	  works	  full-­‐time	  in	  periods	  1	  and	  2.	  This	  income	  stream	  is	  denoted	  by	  m1w	  and	  m2w.	  If	  the	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individual	  goes	  to	  college,	  he	  works	  part-­‐time	  in	  period	  1	  while	  attending	  college	  and	  works	  full-­‐time	  in	  period	  2.	  This	  income	  stream	  is	  denoted	  by	  m1c	  and	  m2c.	  	   I	  will	  make	  some	  assumptions	  regarding	  incomes.	  When	  an	  individual	  chooses	  to	  attend	  college,	  he	  receives	  a	  relatively	  low	  wage	  in	  period	  1.	  However,	  in	  period	  2,	  he	  will	  receive	  a	  relatively	  high	  wage	  as	  a	  result	  of	  his	  human	  capital	  investment	  from	  period	  1.	  When	  an	  individual	  chooses	  to	  not	  attend	  college,	  he	  will	  receive	  a	  moderate	  wage	  in	  both	  period	  1	  and	  period	  2,	  but	  his	  period	  2	  wage	  is	  higher	  than	  his	  period	  1	  wage	  because	  of	  gained	  experience.	  However,	  his	  wage	  in	  neither	  period	  will	  be	  as	  great	  as	  that	  of	  the	  period	  2	  wage	  for	  the	  choice	  to	  attend	  college.	  I	  also	  assume	  that	  the	  period	  1	  wage	  for	  the	  choice	  to	  attend	  college	  is	  less	  than	  the	  period	  1	  wage	  for	  the	  choice	  to	  not	  attend	  college,	  and	  that	  the	  period	  2	  wage	  for	  the	  choice	  to	  attend	  college	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  period	  2	  wage	  for	  the	  choice	  to	  not	  attend	  college.	  Lastly,	  I	  assume	  the	  combined	  wages	  from	  attending	  college	  are	  greater	  than	  the	  combined	  wages	  from	  not	  attending	  college.	  These	  assumptions	  are	  described	  in	  equations	  4a-­‐4e,	  which	  imply	  equation	  4f.	  Appendix	  C	  shows	  the	  derivation	  of	  equation	  4.	  
 𝑚!! < 𝑚!! 	   (4a)	  
 𝑚!! < 𝑚!! 	   (4b)	  
 𝑚!! < 𝑚!! 	   (4c)	  
 𝑚!! < 𝑚!! 	   (4d)	  
 𝑚!! +𝑚!! < 𝑚!! +𝑚!! 	   (4e)	  
 𝑚!! < 𝑚!! < 𝑚!! < 𝑚!! 	   (4f)	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   These	  assumptions	  allow	  the	  creation	  of	  two	  different	  budget	  lines,	  one	  for	  when	  the	  individual	  does	  not	  attend	  college	  and	  one	  for	  when	  he	  does,	  for	  which	  the	  utility	  function	  can	  be	  maximized.	  I	  draw	  on	  the	  utility	  maximization	  problem	  from	  equation	  3	  for	  each	  case	  to	  derive	  equation	  5	  and	  equation	  6.	  The	  derivations	  of	  equation	  5	  and	  equation	  6	  are	  shown	  in	  Appendix	  D	  and	  Appendix	  E	  respectively.	  Equation	  5	  represents	  the	  choice	  to	  not	  attend	  college.	  
 Max 𝑈 = 𝐶! ∗ 𝐶!!  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑜  𝐶! + !!!!! = 𝑚!! + !!!!!! 	   (5a)	  
 𝐶!! = 11+ 𝑏 𝑚!!1+ 𝑟 +𝑚!! 	   (5b)	  
 𝐶!! = 𝑏1+ 𝑏 𝑚!!(1+ 𝑟)+𝑚!! 	   (5c)	  
 𝑈! = 𝐶!! ∗ 𝐶!!!	   (5d)	  Equation	  6	  represents	  the	  choice	  to	  attend	  college.	  
 Max	  U = 𝐶! ∗ 𝐶!!  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑜  𝐶! + !!!!! = 𝑚!! + !!!!!! 	   (6a)	  
 𝐶!! = 11+ 𝑏 𝑚!!1+ 𝑟 +𝑚!! 	   (6b)	  
 𝐶!! = 𝑏1+ 𝑏 𝑚!!(1+ 𝑟)+𝑚!! 	   (6c)	  
 𝑈! = 𝐶!! ∗ 𝐶!!!	   (6d)	  The	  new	  optimal	  consumption	  values	  for	  each	  choice	  give	  the	  utilities	  of	  the	  respective	  choices.	  By	  comparing	  the	  utilities	  Uw	  and	  Uc,	  I	  can	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  individual	  will	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college.	  If	  Uw>Uc,	  the	  individual	  will	  work	  
	   19	  
in	  period	  1.	  If	  Uw<Uc,	  the	  individual	  will	  attend	  college	  in	  period	  1.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  expanded	  model	  is	  provided	  in	  section	  2.4.	  In	  section	  2.5	  I	  incorporate	  cost	  of	  attendance	  into	  the	  model.	  Using	  this	  model,	  I	  can	  manipulate	  the	  interest	  rate	  and	  relative	  incomes	  to	  assess	  how	  low-­‐interest	  loans	  will	  affect	  the	  decision	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  evaluate	  how	  false	  expectations	  about	  future	  earnings	  can	  lead	  to	  an	  individual	  making	  a	  choice	  contrary	  to	  his	  own	  self-­‐interest.	  I	  address	  both	  low-­‐interest	  rate	  loans	  and	  expectations	  in	  chapter	  3.	  
2.4.	  Example	  of	  Expanded	  Model	  	  	   For	  the	  purpose	  of	  example,	  I	  use	  values	  of	  b=.5,	  m1w=$50,	  m2w=$55,	  m1c=$5,	  
m2c=$102,	  and	  r=.1.	  I	  use	  equation	  5	  to	  compute	  C1w=66.67,	  C2w=36.67,	  and	  Uw=404.	  Using	  equation	  6,	  I	  compute	  C1c=65.15,	  C2c=35.83,	  and	  Uc=390.	  In	  this	  simplistic	  example,	  the	  individual	  will	  choose	  to	  work	  and	  forgo	  a	  college	  education,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  lifetime	  income	  is	  greater	  for	  attending	  college	  than	  not	  attending	  college	  ($107	  compared	  to	  $105).	  This	  is	  because	  the	  individual	  puts	  a	  relatively	  high	  weight	  on	  current	  consumption	  C1	  compared	  to	  future	  consumption	  C2,	  i.e.,	  
b=.5.	  	   	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  if	  the	  interest	  rate	  were	  to	  fall,	  e.g.,	  to	  1%	  from	  10%,	  the	  individual	  would	  choose	  to	  attend	  college.	  In	  this	  example	  the	  individual	  would	  have	  utility	  values	  of	  Uw=413<Uc=422.	  Similarly,	  should	  the	  wage	  gap	  for	  period	  2	  income	  due	  to	  a	  college	  degree	  be	  increased	  past	  a	  certain	  threshold,	  the	  individual	  would	  opt	  to	  attend	  college.	  In	  my	  example	  with	  a	  10%	  interest	  rate,	  if	  
m2c≥$105,	  the	  optimal	  choice	  will	  be	  to	  attend	  college.	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An	  example	  of	  the	  expanded	  model	  is	  depicted	  in	  figure	  2.2.	  
	  
Figure	  2.2	  –	  Example	  of	  Expanded	  Model:	  The	  Individual	  Chooses	  Not	  to	  
Attend	  College	  
	  
2.5.	  Cost	  of	  Attendance	  	   Finally,	  in	  this	  section	  I	  incorporate	  into	  the	  model	  a	  cost	  of	  attendance,	  e,	  in	  period	  1	  for	  the	  choice	  to	  attend	  college.	  Intuition	  tells	  us	  that	  this	  will	  have	  the	  most	  direct	  effect	  on	  the	  model	  by	  decreasing	  net	  income	  in	  period	  1	  for	  the	  choice	  to	  attend	  college.	  	  	   Including	  a	  cost	  of	  attendance	  will	  modify	  equation	  6,	  yielding	  equation	  7.	  Equation	  7a	  is	  identical	  to	  equation	  6a,	  except	  that	  m1c	  is	  replaced	  by	  m1c-­‐e.	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   Equation	  7	  represents	  the	  choice	  to	  attend	  college	  with	  cost	  of	  tuition	  included.	  Appendix	  F	  shows	  the	  derivation	  of	  equation7.	  
 Max 𝑈 = 𝐶! ∗ 𝐶!!  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑜  𝐶! + !!!!! = (𝑚!! − 𝑒)+ !!!!!! 	   (7a)	  
 𝐶!! = 11+ 𝑏 𝑚!!1+ 𝑟 + (𝑚!! − 𝑒) 	   (7b)	  
 𝐶!! = 𝑏1+ 𝑏 (𝑚!! − 𝑒)(1+ 𝑟)+𝑚!! 	   (7c)	  
 𝑈! = 𝐶!! ∗ 𝐶!!	   (7d)	  	  	   Note	  that	  using	  equation	  6	  and	  equation	  7,	  C1c-­‐C1e=e/(1+b)>0	  and	  	  
C2c-­‐C2e=be/(1+b)>0.	  Thus	  Uc>Ue,	  and	  including	  the	  cost	  of	  attendance	  lowers	  the	  utility	  of	  attending	  college.	  
2.6	  Summary	  In	  chapter	  2,	  I	  explain	  the	  basic	  model,	  which	  is	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  my	  evaluation.	  From	  there,	  I	  expand	  the	  model	  to	  include	  a	  decision	  to	  attend	  college	  or	  to	  work	  full-­‐time	  in	  period	  1.	  Finally,	  I	  include	  a	  cost	  of	  attendance	  for	  the	  decision	  to	  attend	  college	  in	  period	  1.	  These	  expansions	  of	  the	  model	  increase	  the	  robustness	  and	  applicability	  of	  the	  model.	  	  In	  chapter	  3,	  I	  will	  analyze	  how	  different	  expectations	  and	  loan	  programs	  change	  the	  decision	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college,	  and	  begin	  to	  determine	  answers	  to	  the	  research	  questions.	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Chapter	  3:	  Treatments	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  seek	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  questions	  using	  the	  model	  presented.	  First,	  what	  effect	  do	  interest	  rates	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  student	  loans	  have	  on	  individuals’	  incentives	  to	  attend	  college?	  Second,	  how	  do	  the	  expectations	  of	  graduating	  high	  school	  students	  about	  future	  earnings	  affect	  their	  decision	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college?	  These	  questions	  are	  important	  because	  their	  answers	  can	  serve	  as	  useful	  tools	  in	  evaluating	  how	  certain	  policy	  options	  impact	  the	  incentives	  of	  potential	  college	  students	  deciding	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  attend	  college.	  	  Specifically,	  in	  section	  3.1,	  I	  answer	  the	  first	  research	  question	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  low	  interest	  rate	  loans,	  judging	  the	  effect	  of	  allowing	  students	  to	  borrow	  at	  a	  below-­‐market	  interest	  rate.	  In	  section	  3.2,	  I	  answer	  the	  second	  research	  question	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  incorrect	  expectations.	  In	  section	  3.1,	  I	  analyze	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  model	  to	  different	  interest	  rates	  and	  coefficients	  of	  b.	  
3.1	  Low	  Interest	  Rate	  Loans	  	   The	  key	  difference	  between	  evaluation	  of	  low	  interest	  rate	  loans	  and	  the	  base	  model	  is	  the	  incorporation	  of	  a	  second	  interest	  rate	  i	  representing	  the	  interest	  rate	  of	  borrowing	  to	  attend	  college.	  Here,	  I	  assume	  i	  is	  lower	  than	  the	  market	  rate	  of	  interest	  r,	  e.g.,	  the	  interest	  rate	  on	  a	  student	  loan	  is	  less	  than	  the	  interest	  rate	  on	  a	  personal	  consumption	  loan.	  Additionally,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  money	  borrowed	  for	  this	  purpose	  can	  only	  be	  used	  to	  pay	  for	  college,	  eliminating	  arbitrage	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opportunities	  by	  taking	  out	  such	  loans	  at	  the	  low	  interest	  rate	  then	  subsequently	  lending	  the	  same	  funds	  at	  the	  higher	  market	  rate.	  Equation	  8	  shows	  the	  modifications	  to	  equation	  7	  for	  a	  student	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  obtain	  a	  student	  loan	  at	  a	  below-­‐market	  interest	  rate.	  In	  equation	  8,	  the	  student’s	  period	  1	  income	  
returns	  to	  m1c,	  but	  his	  period	  2	  income	  is	  now	  m2-­‐(1+i)e.	  That	  is,	  the	  individual	  defers	  the	  attendance	  cost	  until	  period	  2,	  at	  which	  time	  the	  individual	  pays	  back	  principle	  plus	  interest.	  	   To	  create	  a	  useful	  example	  of	  the	  model,	  I	  assume	  values	  of	  b=.9333,	  r=.1	  (10%),	  	  m1w=$30,	  m2w=$32.89,	  m1c=$15.08,	  m2c=$52.92,	  e=$3.4,	  and	  i=.09	  (9%).	  The	  values	  for	  incomes	  and	  cost	  of	  attendance	  are	  in	  thousands	  of	  dollars	  per	  year.	  To	  create	  these	  assumptions,	  I	  use	  real	  world	  data	  for	  b,	  m1w,	  m2w,	  m1c,	  and	  m2c.	  These	  values	  come	  from	  Daly	  and	  Bengali’s	  paper:	  a	  value	  of	  6.667%	  discounted	  future	  value,	  the	  average	  value	  of	  an	  AAA	  bond	  between	  1990	  and	  2011;	  a	  value	  of	  $32,890	  mean	  annual	  income	  for	  non-­‐college	  graduates;	  and	  a	  value	  of	  $52,920	  mean	  annual	  income	  for	  college	  graduates.	  A	  Georgetown	  study	  found	  the	  average	  college	  student	  is	  able	  to	  earn	  $15,080	  annually	  through	  part	  time	  or	  full	  time	  work	  (Carnevale	  et	  al.	  
 Max  𝑈 = 𝐶! ∗ 𝐶!!  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑜  𝐶! + !!!!! = 𝑚!! + !!!!!(!!!)!!! 	   (8a)	  
 𝐶!! = 11+ 𝑏 𝑚!! +𝑚!! − 1+ 𝑖 𝑒1+ 𝑟 	   (8b)	  
 𝑐!! = 𝑏1+ 𝑏 𝑚!! 1+ 𝑟 +𝑚!! − 1+ 𝑖 𝑒 	   (8c)	  
 𝑈! = 𝐶!! ∗ 𝐶!!!	   (8d)	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2015).	  By	  using	  real	  world	  data	  for	  some	  of	  the	  values,	  the	  model	  is	  made	  more	  interesting	  and	  robust.	  	   Two	  values	  that	  are	  not	  based	  on	  real-­‐world	  data	  are	  e=$3,400	  and	  r=10%.	  This	  tuition	  figure	  is	  well	  below	  the	  national	  average	  of	  just	  over	  $25,000	  for	  annual	  tuition.	  Additionally	  the	  current	  market	  rate	  of	  interest	  for	  a	  typical	  student	  is	  closer	  to	  5%.	  However,	  using	  such	  estimates	  would	  unnecessarily	  complicate	  the	  example	  by	  creating	  utility	  values	  with	  differences	  to	  multiple	  decimal	  places.	  Because	  utility	  values	  are	  a	  theoretical	  tool	  used	  to	  evaluate	  optimal	  decision	  making,	  not	  a	  real	  world	  value	  and	  are	  ordinal,	  not	  cardinal,	  using	  simplified	  values	  allows	  for	  an	  easier	  understanding	  of	  the	  model’s	  findings	  without	  actually	  changing	  any	  of	  the	  intuitions.	  	   Under	  these	  assumptions,	  a	  potential	  undergraduate	  student	  who	  must	  borrow	  at	  the	  market	  rate	  of	  interest	  to	  pay	  the	  cost	  of	  tuition	  will	  choose	  to	  forgo	  a	  college	  education	  to	  work	  instead:	  using	  equations	  6	  and	  8,	  with	  i=r,	  I	  calculate	  
Uw=782>Ue=780.	  However,	  if	  that	  student	  is	  eligible	  for	  a	  low	  interest	  student	  loan,	  he	  will	  instead	  opt	  to	  attend	  college:	  using	  equations	  6	  and	  8,	  I	  calculate	  
Uw=782<Ui=785.	  This	  is	  of	  interest	  because	  it	  shows	  how	  a	  low	  interest	  rate	  loan	  can	  change	  the	  optimal	  choice	  for	  a	  potential	  college	  attendee.	  In	  the	  example	  here,	  despite	  only	  a	  1%	  lower	  interest	  rate,	  the	  individual’s	  choice	  changed	  from	  not	  attending	  college	  to	  attending	  college.	  	   Further,	  this	  example	  is	  in	  line	  with	  one’s	  intuition.	  It	  makes	  sense	  that	  borrowing	  at	  a	  discounted	  interest	  rate	  is	  preferable	  to	  borrowing	  at	  the	  market	  rate	  of	  interest.	  This	  example	  is	  interesting	  because	  it	  shows	  that	  discounted	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interest	  rates	  can	  change	  the	  optimal	  choice	  for	  a	  recent	  high	  school	  graduate	  trying	  to	  decided	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  attend	  college.	  	   Most	  importantly,	  this	  example	  allows	  for	  a	  qualified	  answer	  to	  the	  first	  research	  question;	  what	  effect	  do	  interest	  rates	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  student	  loans	  have	  on	  individuals’	  incentives	  to	  attend	  college?	  Low	  interest	  student	  loan	  programs	  can	  increase	  the	  incentive	  to	  attend	  college	  for	  at	  least	  some	  students.	  	  	   	   	  
3.2	  Expectations	  	   The	  second	  research	  question	  is	  how	  do	  the	  expectations	  of	  graduating	  high	  school	  students	  about	  future	  earnings	  affect	  their	  decision	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college?	  This	  is	  an	  important	  question	  because	  if	  a	  student’s	  expectations	  vary	  from	  actual	  results,	  this	  may	  lead	  him	  to	  make	  a	  suboptimal	  decision	  about	  attending	  or	  not	  attending	  college.	  Further,	  this	  would	  serve	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  an	  explanation	  for	  a	  bubble	  in	  higher	  education,	  should	  one	  exist.	  	   To	  address	  the	  research	  question,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  expanded	  model	  with	  cost	  e,	  but	  for	  simplicity	  all	  borrowing	  occurs	  at	  the	  market	  rate	  of	  interest	  r.	  Low-­‐interest	  rate	  loans	  could	  be	  included,	  but	  would	  unnecessarily	  complicate	  the	  example	  without	  changing	  any	  of	  the	  intuitions.	  I	  again	  assume	  b=.9333,	  r=.1	  (10%),	  m1w=$30,	  
m2w=$32.89,	  m1c=$15.08,	  m2c=$52.92,	  and	  e=$3.4.	  Incomes	  and	  cost	  of	  tuition	  are	  stated	  in	  thousands	  of	  dollars	  per	  year.	  In	  this	  example	  the	  individual	  chooses	  to	  work	  instead	  of	  attend	  college,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  lifetime	  earnings	  are	  greater	  for	  attending	  college:	  Uw=782>Ue=780.	  However,	  what	  if	  this	  individual	  falsely	  expected	  to	  earn	  more	  after	  completing	  a	  college	  degree	  than	  the	  actual	  m2c?	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   To	  address	  this,	  I	  denote	  expected	  period	  2	  income	  for	  a	  student	  who	  attends	  college	  as	  m2x.	  I	  assume	  m2x=$54,	  which	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  true	  m2c=52.92.	  Under	  such	  circumstances,	  the	  individual	  would	  have	  an	  expected	  utility	  of	  Ux=805	  from	  attending	  college,	  which	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  utility	  from	  not	  attending	  college	  in	  period	  1,	  Uw=782.	  Because	  the	  expected	  utility	  is	  greater	  than	  that	  of	  working,	  but	  the	  realized	  utility	  Ue=780	  is	  less	  than	  that	  of	  working,	  this	  individual	  will	  make	  a	  suboptimal	  choice	  to	  attend	  college.	  	   This	  is	  useful	  because	  it	  shows	  how	  even	  a	  small	  difference	  between	  expected	  and	  annual	  income,	  <2%,	  can	  lead	  to	  an	  individual	  making	  a	  suboptimal	  choice.	  If	  such	  a	  misperception	  were	  widespread,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  individuals	  could	  make	  a	  suboptimal	  decision	  to	  attend	  college.	  Collectively	  this	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  bubble	  in	  the	  area	  of	  higher	  education.	  If	  market	  participants	  are	  willing	  to	  pay	  more	  for	  a	  product	  than	  its	  actual	  value,	  that	  will	  create	  a	  bubble.	  College	  degrees	  are	  not	  like	  other	  investment	  instruments	  in	  that	  their	  value	  cannot	  be	  transferred	  from	  one	  individual	  to	  another.	  This	  makes	  it	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  is	  a	  bubble	  in	  the	  undergraduate	  education	  sector.	  However,	  with	  this	  model,	  it’s	  clear	  how	  one	  could	  be	  or	  have	  been	  started.	  	  	  	  
3.3	  Sensitivity	  Test	  	   Before	  concluding	  chapter	  3,	  it	  is	  worth	  a	  quick	  analysis	  of	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  model	  to	  the	  market	  rate	  of	  interest	  r	  and	  discounted	  future	  value	  b.	  Because	  this	  paper	  seeks	  to	  understand	  how	  low	  interest	  rate	  loans	  and	  expectations	  affect	  the	  choice	  of	  whether	  to	  attend	  college,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  have	  some	  evaluation	  as	  to	  how	  sensitive	  the	  results	  are	  to	  the	  assumption	  used	  for	  b	  and	  r.	  That	  is,	  the	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intuition	  that	  lowering	  the	  interest	  rate	  should	  encourage	  college	  attendance	  ought	  to	  hold.	  I	  test	  the	  sensitivity	  by	  holding	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  parameters	  constant	  with	  the	  same	  values	  used	  in	  the	  examples	  from	  section	  3.2	  of	  m1w=$30,	  m2w=$32.89,	  
m1c=$15.08,	  m2c=$52.92,	  and	  e=$3.4.	  I	  then	  test	  numerous	  values	  for	  variables	  r	  and	  
b,	  determining	  if	  for	  each	  set	  of	  values	  the	  student	  would	  choose	  to	  attend	  college	  borrowing	  money	  at	  the	  market	  rate	  of	  interest	  with	  added	  cost	  of	  tuition	  or	  work	  full-­‐time	  in	  period	  1.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  test	  are	  depicted	  in	  Table	  2.	  	  





	   5%	   7%	   9%	   10%	   11%	  .2	   College	   College	   College	   Work	   Work	  .5	   College	   College	   College	   Work	   Work	  .8	   College	   College	   College	   Work	   Work	  
.9333	   College	   College	   College	   Work*	   Work	  
1	   College	   College	   College	   Work	   Work	  	   *	  Values	  used	  in	  sections	  3.1	  and	  3.2;	  when	  the	  interest	  rate	  is	  equal	  to	  10%	  with	  a	  discounted	  future	  value	  of	  .9333,	  this	  student	  will	  choose	  to	  work	  full-­‐time	  instead	  of	  attend	  college	  when	  borrowing	  at	  the	  market	  rate	  of	  interest.	  	  This	  shows	  that	  the	  model	  is	  sensitive	  to	  interest	  rate	  but	  not	  to	  the	  discounted	  future	  value.	  This	  suggests	  that	  interest	  rates	  will	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  decision	  to	  attend	  college,	  but	  the	  coefficient	  used	  for	  discounted	  future	  value	  will	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not.	  This	  shows	  that	  the	  model	  is	  isolating	  the	  interest	  rate,	  which	  is	  useful	  in	  determining	  the	  effect	  of	  low-­‐interest	  rate	  loans	  on	  the	  decision	  to	  attend	  college.	  
3.4	  Summary	  	   In	  chapter	  3,	  I	  utilize	  the	  model	  to	  address	  two	  research	  questions.	  First,	  what	  effect	  do	  interest	  rates	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  student	  loans	  have	  on	  individuals’	  incentives	  to	  attend	  college?	  Second,	  how	  do	  the	  expectations	  of	  graduating	  high	  school	  students	  about	  future	  earnings	  affect	  their	  decision	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college?	  	  While	  not	  definitive,	  the	  treatments	  show	  that	  1)	  loan	  structure,	  especially	  low-­‐interest	  rate	  loans,	  can	  increase	  the	  incentive	  to	  attend	  college,	  and	  2)	  that	  overly	  optimistic	  expectations	  about	  future	  income	  can	  mistakenly	  increase	  the	  incentive	  to	  attend	  college.	  How	  much	  either	  of	  these	  does	  in	  fact	  account	  for	  cumulative	  enrollment	  levels	  is	  an	  open	  question.	  What	  is	  clear	  is	  low-­‐interest	  student	  loans	  and	  incorrect	  expectations	  about	  future	  earnings	  can	  potentially	  influence	  a	  student	  to	  change	  his	  or	  her	  decision.	  Further	  research	  is	  clearly	  needed,	  but	  this	  model	  is	  useful	  in	  beginning	  a	  discussion	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  student	  loan	  programs	  and	  students’	  expectations	  on	  their	  decisions	  on	  attending	  college.	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Chapter	  4:	  Conclusion	  
In	  Chapter	  1,	  I	  reviewed	  the	  present	  literature	  on	  student	  loan	  debt.	  I	  concluded	  that	  while	  academics	  and	  the	  general	  public	  alike	  proclaim	  student	  loan	  debt	  to	  be	  an	  important	  and	  major	  issue,	  very	  little	  research	  exists	  on	  the	  actual	  affects	  many	  loan	  programs	  have	  on	  the	  incentives	  to	  attend	  college.	  Government	  leaders	  routinely	  espouse	  the	  virtues	  of	  their	  own	  individual	  programs,	  but	  rarely	  are	  these	  virtues	  backed	  up	  by	  hard	  fact.	  Further,	  it	  is	  a	  commonly	  agreed	  upon	  notion	  that	  society	  benefits	  from	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  the	  population	  attending	  college.	  A	  better-­‐educated	  population	  leads	  to	  greater	  innovation,	  greater	  economic	  growth,	  and	  an	  improved	  standard	  of	  living.	  However,	  it	  is	  yet	  unclear	  that	  the	  programs	  designed	  to	  incentivize	  greater	  college	  attendance	  are	  actually	  achieving	  their	  stated	  goal.	   In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  presented	  the	  basic	  model	  by	  which	  I	  sought	  to	  examine	  the	  two	  research	  questions.	  Ultimately,	  I	  believe	  this	  model	  can	  begin	  a	  discussion	  and	  further	  research	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  student	  loan	  programs.	  	  In	  Chapter	  3,	  I	  used	  the	  model	  established	  in	  Chapter	  2	  to	  test	  the	  effects	  of	  low	  interest	  rate	  loans	  and	  student	  expectations	  on	  the	  incentives	  to	  attend	  college.	  I	  found	  that	  both	  of	  these	  loan	  types	  do	  in	  fact	  incentivize	  college	  attendance	  and	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  change	  the	  decision	  of	  some	  students.	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   In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  tie	  together	  these	  findings	  with	  real	  world	  context,	  before	  discussing	  areas	  for	  further	  research.	  	  
4.1	  Discussion	  	   This	  paper	  started	  with	  two	  research	  questions.	  First,	  what	  effect	  do	  interest	  rates	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  student	  loans	  have	  on	  individuals’	  incentives	  to	  attend	  college?	  Second,	  how	  do	  the	  expectations	  of	  graduating	  high	  school	  students	  about	  future	  earnings	  affect	  their	  decision	  to	  attend	  or	  not	  attend	  college?	  	   In	  evaluating	  these	  research	  questions,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  model	  were	  mixed.	  The	  model	  successfully	  established	  that	  low-­‐interest	  rate	  loan	  programs	  do	  increase	  the	  incentives	  to	  attend	  college.	  Further,	  these	  loans	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  change	  the	  decision	  to	  attend	  college	  for	  some	  students.	  This	  means	  that	  for	  the	  over	  34	  million	  students	  who	  took	  low-­‐interest	  loans	  to	  pay	  for	  their	  undergraduate	  education,	  they	  will	  gain	  a	  greater	  utility	  from	  their	  college	  education	  than	  without	  these	  loans.	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  basic	  economic	  theory	  –	  if	  these	  students	  are	  rational	  actors,	  taking	  these	  loans	  implies	  a	  higher	  utility	  from	  the	  loans	  than	  from	  not	  taking	  the	  loans.	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  portion	  of	  these	  students	  would	  not	  have	  attended	  college	  without	  these	  loans.	  However,	  it	  is	  impossible	  with	  this	  simple	  model	  to	  estimate	  the	  number	  of	  students	  whose	  decision	  was	  actually	  affected	  by	  the	  established	  incentives	  of	  a	  low-­‐interest	  rate	  loan.	  	   As	  for	  expectations,	  the	  model	  shows	  how	  even	  a	  small	  difference	  between	  the	  expected	  and	  realized	  results	  of	  attending	  college	  for	  a	  student	  can	  alter	  their	  optimal	  decision.	  In	  the	  example,	  a	  $1,080	  difference	  (<2%)	  between	  expected	  and	  
	   31	  
realized	  salary	  was	  enough	  to	  alter	  the	  optimal	  decision.	  However,	  while	  anecdotal	  evidence	  and	  the	  national	  conscience	  suggest	  that	  college	  students	  have	  an	  inflated	  idea	  of	  the	  value	  of	  their	  college	  degrees	  the	  data	  simply	  aren’t	  there	  to	  confirm	  or	  deny	  this	  trend.	  	  	   All	  in	  all,	  what	  the	  model	  does	  is	  begin	  an	  important	  conversation	  about	  how	  our	  student	  loan	  system	  actually	  creates	  the	  desired	  effect	  of	  increasing	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  students	  attend	  college.	  Politicians	  want	  to	  say	  their	  particular	  programs	  promote	  greater	  college	  attendance	  for	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  population	  that	  would	  otherwise	  not	  attend.	  What	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  model	  is	  that	  this	  is	  possible	  to	  achieve.	  However,	  further	  research	  is	  clearly	  needed	  to	  establish	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  certain	  programs	  achieve	  their	  desired	  goal.	  Further,	  it	  is	  unclear	  which	  direction	  students’	  misperceptions	  about	  future	  incomes	  go.	  What	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  a	  student	  may	  under	  or	  overvalue	  their	  degree,	  leading	  to	  a	  suboptimal	  decision.	  Again,	  further	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  establish	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  affects	  our	  university	  system	  and	  how	  this	  potential	  affect	  can	  be	  combatted.	  	  	   I	  conclude	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  some	  ways	  the	  model	  can	  be	  expanded	  and	  where	  further	  research	  is	  necessary	  in	  section	  4.2.	  I	  believe	  this	  paper	  and	  model	  to	  have	  achieved	  something	  and	  added	  to	  the	  academic	  literature	  by	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  greater	  discussion	  and	  research	  into	  the	  area	  of	  student	  loan	  debt.	  	  
4.2	  Areas	  for	  Further	  Research	  	   The	  most	  immediately	  obvious	  area	  for	  further	  study	  is	  into	  other	  student	  loan	  types.	  As	  the	  cost	  of	  education	  rises,	  two	  growing	  areas	  of	  student	  debt	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refinancing	  are	  loan	  forgiveness	  and	  income-­‐based	  repayment.	  Because	  both	  loan	  forgiveness	  and	  income-­‐based	  repayment	  require	  a	  period	  of	  repayment	  as	  well	  as	  a	  period	  of	  post-­‐repayment	  to	  properly	  address	  their	  unique	  characteristics,	  anything	  less	  than	  a	  three	  period	  model,	  such	  as	  the	  two	  period	  model	  I	  use,	  is	  insufficient	  to	  analyze	  these	  two	  refinancing	  methods.	  	  	   With	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  model	  to	  three	  periods,	  however,	  the	  analysis	  of	  all	  income	  types	  could	  become	  even	  clearer.	  With	  a	  first	  period	  of	  work	  or	  college	  attendance,	  followed	  by	  a	  second	  period	  of	  work	  (while	  paying	  debts	  for	  the	  choice	  to	  attend	  college),	  with	  a	  third	  period	  of	  work	  for	  both	  choices,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  look	  at	  how	  different	  levels	  of	  forgiveness	  and	  types	  of	  income	  based	  repayment	  plans	  may	  incentivize	  attendance.	  Such	  a	  model	  is	  beyond	  my	  present	  capabilities,	  but	  this	  two	  period	  model	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  in	  building	  such	  a	  three	  period	  model.	  	  	   Finally,	  should	  greater	  data	  be	  made	  available,	  perhaps	  greater	  examples	  using	  real	  world	  data	  could	  be	  useful.	  As	  it	  stands,	  the	  model	  builds	  good	  theoretical	  knowledge	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  student	  loan	  programs,	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  in	  some	  areas	  that	  empirical	  data	  don’t	  always	  match	  up	  with	  theory.	  To	  empirically	  test	  the	  predictive	  power	  of	  the	  model,	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  data	  is	  required.	  These	  empirical	  data	  extend	  not	  only	  to	  the	  costs	  of	  college	  and	  discount	  rates	  of	  college	  attendees	  but	  also	  the	  expectations	  of	  potential	  college	  students.	  In	  my	  model	  a	  single	  discount	  rate	  was	  used,	  but	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  someone	  who	  does	  not	  attend	  college	  shows	  a	  revealed	  preference	  for	  present	  consumption	  greater	  than	  those	  who	  do	  attend;	  this	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may	  have	  interesting	  effects	  on	  the	  model.	  It	  is	  also	  clear	  expectations	  can	  have	  an	  important	  effect,	  but	  without	  adequate	  data	  the	  extent	  of	  this	  effect	  is	  unclear.	  	  	   In	  conclusion,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  present	  loan	  programs	  do	  incentivize	  greater	  college	  attendance.	  What	  is	  unclear	  and	  requires	  further	  research	  is	  the	  extent	  of	  this	  effect	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  some	  of	  the	  more	  unique	  types	  of	  loan	  options.	  With	  more	  research,	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  create	  more	  efficient	  loan	  programs	  that	  incentivize	  greater	  college	  attendance.	  As	  this	  goal	  is	  widely	  accepted	  to	  be	  a	  just	  one	  and	  shared	  by	  many	  political	  leaders,	  this	  area	  of	  study	  should	  be	  taken	  seriously	  and	  widely	  studied	  in	  the	  near	  future.
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Appendix	  A	  –	  Equations	  1,	  2,	  and	  8	  Equation	  1,	  U(C1,	  C2)=C1	  *	  C2b,	  is	  a	  basic	  Cobb-­‐Douglas	  utility	  function	  commonly	  used	  in	  microeconomics	  to	  show	  the	  utility	  an	  individual	  gains	  from	  consumption	  of	  two	  goods	  or	  baskets	  of	  goods,	  i.e.,	  total	  consumption	  in	  period	  1	  and	  total	  consumption	  in	  period	  2.	  Equation	  2,	  C1+[C2/(1+r)]=m1+[m2/(1+r)],	  shows	  total	  consumption	  on	  the	  left	  side	  of	  the	  equation	  equal	  to	  total	  income	  on	  the	  right	  side	  of	  the	  equation,	  i.e.,	  an	  individual	  consumes	  in	  period	  1	  and	  period	  2	  as	  much	  but	  no	  greater	  than	  their	  income	  in	  period	  1	  and	  period	  2	  plus	  or	  minus	  interest	  from	  borrowing	  or	  lending	  in	  period	  1.	  These	  equations	  can	  be	  found	  elsewhere,	  but	  in	  my	  paper	  come	  directly	  from	  Chapter	  4	  on	  utility	  in	  Hal	  Varian’s	  Intermediate	  
Microeconomics:	  A	  modern	  Approach	  8th	  Edition.	  In	  appendices	  B-­‐F	  I	  show	  the	  derivation	  of	  equations	  3	  through	  7.	  In	  the	  text,	  equation	  8	  is	  a	  modification	  of	  equation	  7	  by	  incorporating	  a	  low	  interest	  rate	  for	  the	  choice	  to	  attend	  college	  instead	  of	  work	  full	  time	  in	  period	  1,	  i.e.,	  the	  student’s	  period	  1	  income	  returns	  to	  m1c	  while	  his	  period	  2	  income	  is	  now	  m2-­‐(1+e)i.	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Appendix	  B	  –	  Equation	  3	  
	   1. Equation	  2:	  C1+[C2/(1+r)]=m1+[m2/(1+r)]	  2. C2(m1,m2,C1,r)=[m1+(m2/{1+r})-­‐C1]*(1+r)	  3. Equation	  1:	  U(C1,	  C2)=C1	  *	  C2b	  	  4. Substitute	  C2(m1,m2,C1,r)	  into	  equation	  1:	  U(C1)=C1	  *	  {[	  m1+(m2/{1+r})-­‐
C1]*(1+r)}b	  
5. Maximize	  Utility:	  U’(C1)	  =	  {[	  m1+(m2/{1+r})-­‐C1]*(1+r)}b-­‐(1+r)(b*C1)	  {[	  
m1+(m2/{1+r})-­‐C1]*(1+r)}b-­‐1	  =	  0	  
6. C1*=	  [1/(1+b)]	  *	  [(m2/1+r)+m1]	  
7. C2(m1,m2,C1*,r)=	  C2*=	  [b/(1+b)]	  *	  [(m1	  *	  [1+r])+m2]	  8. U*=C1*(C2*)	  
 	  
 𝑈 𝐶!,𝐶! = 𝐶! ∗ 𝐶!!  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑜  𝐶! + 𝐶!1+ 𝑟 = 𝑚! + 𝑚!1+ 𝑟 	   (3a)	  
 𝐶!∗ = 11+ 𝑏 𝑚!1+ 𝑟 +𝑚! 	   (3b)	  
 𝐶!∗ = 𝑏1+ 𝑏 𝑚!(1+ 𝑟)+𝑚! 	   (3c)	  
 𝑈∗ = 𝐶!∗ ∗ 𝐶!∗!	   (3d)	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Appendix	  C	  –	  Equation	  4	  	  
 𝑚!! < 𝑚!! 	   (4a)	  
 𝑚!! < 𝑚!! 	   (4b)	  
 𝑚!! < 𝑚!! 	   (4c)	  
 𝑚!! < 𝑚!! 	   (4d)	  
 𝑚!! +𝑚!! < 𝑚!! +𝑚!! 	   (4e)	  
 𝑚!! < 𝑚!! < 𝑚!! < 𝑚!! 	   (4f)	  	   1. Start	  with	  the	  axioms	  from	  equations	  4a-­‐4e	  2. By	  the	  transitive	  property,	  if	  m1w<m2w	  	  and	  m2w<m2c	  then	  m1w<m2c	  3. By	  the	  transitive	  property,	  if	  m1c<m1w	  and	  m1w<m2w	  then	  m1c<m2w	  4. Based	  on	  1-­‐3,	  it	  must	  be	  that	  m1c<m1w<m2w<m2c	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Appendix	  D	  –	  Equation	  5	  	  
Max 𝑈 = 𝐶! ∗ 𝐶!!  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑜  𝐶! + !!!!! = 𝑚!! + !!!!!! 	   (5a)	  
𝐶!! = 11+ 𝑏 𝑚!!1+ 𝑟 +𝑚!! 	   (5b)	  
𝐶!! = 𝑏1+ 𝑏 𝑚!!(1+ 𝑟)+𝑚!! 	   (5c)	  𝑈! = 𝐶!! ∗ 𝐶!!!	   (5d)	  1. Equation	  2:	  C1+[C2/(1+r)]=m1+[m2/(1+r)]	  2. C2(m1w,m2w,C1,r)=[m1w+(m2w/{1+r})-­‐C1]*(1+r)	  3. Equation	  1:	  U(C1,	  C2)=C1	  *	  C2b	  	  4. Substitute	  C2(m1w,m2w,C1,r)	  into	  equation	  1:	  U(C1)=C1	  *	  {[	  m1w+(m2w/{1+r})-­‐
C1]*(1+r)}b	  
5. Maximize	  Utility:	  U’(C1)	  =	  {[	  m1w+(m2w/{1+r})-­‐C1]*(1+r)}b-­‐(1+r)(b*C1)	  {[	  
m1w+(m2w/{1+r})-­‐C1]*(1+r)}b-­‐1=	  0	  6. C1w=	  [1/(1+b)]	  *	  [(m2w/1+r)+m1w]	  7. C2(m1,m2,C1w,r)=	  C2w=	  [b/(1+b)]	  *	  [(m1w	  	  *	  [1+r])+m2w]	  8. Uw=C1w(C2w)b	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Appendix	  E	  –	  Equation	  6	  	  
Max	  U = 𝐶! ∗ 𝐶!!  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑜  𝐶! + !!!!! = 𝑚!! + !!!!!! 	   (6a)	  
𝐶!! = 11+ 𝑏 𝑚!!1+ 𝑟 +𝑚!! 	   (6b)	  
𝐶!! = 𝑏1+ 𝑏 𝑚!!(1+ 𝑟)+𝑚!! 	   (6c)	  
𝑈! = 𝐶!! ∗ 𝐶!!!	   (6d)	  1. Equation	  2:	  C1+[C2/(1+r)]=m1+[m2/(1+r)]	  2. C2(m1c,m2c,C1,r)=[m1c+(m2c/{1+r})-­‐C1]*(1+r)	  3. Equation	  1:	  U(C1,	  C2)=C1	  *	  C2b	  	  4. Substitute	  C2(m1c,m2c,C1,r)	  into	  equation	  1:	  U(C1)=C1	  *	  {[	  m1c+(m2c/{1+r})-­‐
C1]*(1+r)}b	  
5. Maximize	  Utility:	  U’(C1)	  =	  {[	  m1c+(m2c/{1+r})-­‐C1]*(1+r)}b-­‐(1+r)(b*C1)	  {[	  
m1c+(m2c/{1+r})-­‐C1]*(1+r)}b-­‐1=	  0	  6. C1c=	  [1/(1+b)]	  *	  [(m2c/1+r)+m1c]	  7. C2(m1,m2,C1c,r)=	  C2c=	  [b/(1+b)]	  *	  [(m1c	  	  *	  [1+r])+m2c]	  8. Uc=C1c(C2c)b	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Appendix	  F	  –	  Equation	  7	  	  
Max 𝑈 = 𝐶! ∗ 𝐶!!  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑜  𝐶! + !!!!! = (𝑚!! − 𝑒)+ !!!!!! 	   (7a)	  
𝐶!! = 11+ 𝑏 𝑚!!1+ 𝑟 + (𝑚!! − 𝑒) 	   (7b)	  
𝐶!! = 𝑏1+ 𝑏 (𝑚!! − 𝑒)(1+ 𝑟)+𝑚!! 	   (7c)	  
𝑈! = 𝐶!! ∗ 𝐶!!	   (7d)	  1. Equation	  2:	  C1+[C2/(1+r)]=m1+[m2/(1+r)]	  2. C2(m1c,m2c,C1,r,e)=[(m1c-­‐e)+(m2c/{1+r})-­‐C1]*(1+r)	  3. Equation	  1:	  U(C1,	  C2)=C1	  *	  C2b	  	  4. Substitute	  C2(m1c,m2c,C1,r,e)	  into	  equation	  1:	  U(C1)=C1	  *	  {[	  (m1c-­‐e)+(m2c/{1+r})-­‐
C1]*(1+r)}b	  
5. Maximize	  Utility:	  U’(C1)	  =	  {[	  (m1c-­‐e)+(m2c/{1+r})-­‐C1]*(1+r)}b-­‐(1+r)(b*C1)	  {[	  
(m1c-­‐e)+(m2c/{1+r})-­‐C1]*(1+r)}b-­‐1=	  0	  6. C1e=	  [1/(1+b)]	  *	  [(m2c/1+r)+(m1c-­‐e)]	  7. C2(m1,m2,C1c,r,e)=	  C2e=	  [b/(1+b)]	  *	  {[(m1c-­‐e)	  *	  (1+r)]+m2c}	  8. Ue=C1e(C2e)b	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